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RECENT LEGISLATION
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR TORTS
OF EMPLOYEES-THE END OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
CALIFORNIA
In 1963 the California Legislature enacted the first general law
dealing with the liability of governmental entities for the torts of
their employees.' The basic objective was to immunize govern-
mental entities. Liability would attach only by statutory exception,
as determined by the Legislature.' Sovereign immunity, an ancient
common law doctrine largely rejected in other important jurisdic-
tions, was to be reaffirmed in California law. This objective was
not attained. Rather than general immunity, the concept of general
liability has resulted. Immunity, instead of liability, attaches only
by statutory exception. It is the purpose of this article to examine
those provisions of the 1963 enactment which bring to an end the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in California.4
THE PROBLEM
The California Supreme Court decided two cases early in 1961
which evoked an immediate reaction from the California Legislature.
In Muskopj v. Corning Hospital District5 the court held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity would no longer protect public
entities from civil liability for their torts. The Supreme Court in
Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District6 stated that the
doctrine of discretionary immunity, which protects public employees
from liability for their discretionary acts, might not protect public
entities from liability in all situations where the employees are im-
mune. The Legislature reacted at once, passing Chapter 1404 of the
Statutes of 1961, which suspended the effect of these decisions until
1 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-895.8.
2 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep., Rec. & Studies 811 (1963).
8 Id. at 812.
4 Other bills passed in Stats. 1963 include:
Chapter 1715, Claims, Actions and Judgments against Public Entities and Public
Employees. Chapter 1682, Insurance Coverage for Public Entities and Public Em-
ployees. Chapter 1683, Defense of Public Employees. Chapter 1684, Workmen's
Compensation Benefits for Persons Assisting Law Enforcement or Fire Control
Officers.
6 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
6 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
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the ninety-first day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Legisla-
ture. For the next two years the California Law Revision Commis-
sion studied the problem of sovereign immunity. It submitted propo-
sals to the 1963 session of the Legislature, most of which were en-
acted into law with minor changes. 7 The most important provision
states that a public entity is liable for the tort of its employee
within the scope of his employment, to the extent that the employee
is personally liable, and, unless an enactment declares a contrary
rule, the entity is immune from liability for an act or omission of its
employee if the employee himself is immune from liability.8 Of
the many provisions conferring immunity, the most significant
provides that a public employee is not liable for discretionary acts
within the scope of his employment.'
These provisions have a twofold effect: (1) the entity is liable
as a private person except where given immunity by statute;
(2) the liability of both entity and employee is based on the deter-
mination of whether the act of the employee is discretionary or
ministerial. Therefore, the question is: What is a discretionary act?
The Background: Discretionary v. Ministerial
Prior to 1961 California law regarding the liability of a public
entity for the torts of a public employee was determined by one
of two related doctrines. An entity was liable for proprietary activ-
ities, and immune from liability for strictly governmental activities.'"
An employee was liable for ministerial actions, and immune from
liability for discretionary acts." Generally, the protection granted
to the employee, for torts resulting from discretionary acts or omis-
sions, extended also to the employer.'"
Both Muskopf and Lipman left untouched the "discretionary
act" rule to the extent that it protected the employee. However,
the protection formerly available to the public entity was abolished.
Muskopf imposed general liability upon the public entity, thereby
eliminating the need to determine whether the activity involved
was proprietary or governmental. Lipman suggested that the lia-
bility of the entity would not be coextensive with the liability of
the employee-tortfeasor, but would depend upon various other fac-
tors-the importance of the public functions, the extent to which
liability might impair free exercise of these functions, and the
7 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep., Rec. & Studies Report, at 219-224 (1963).8 See note 3 supra.
9 Ibid.
10 PROSSER, TORTS, 774 (2d ed. 1955).
11 id. at 781.
12 See note 2 supra, at 815.
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presence of remedies other than tort suits for damages."8 Under
Lipman a finding that the employee's act was discretionary would
not protect the entity. It would have been necessary to show in
addition that some vital public interest would be threatened if
immunity was denied the entity. The 1963 enactment forecloses
this possibility by providing that a public entity is not liable for
an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where
the employee is immune from liability. 4
Under the liability provisions of the new legislation, the em-
ployee is liable as a private person for his tortious conduct unless
otherwise provided, and he is accorded the defenses normally avail-
able to private persons.'5 The primary exception is for discretionary
acts.' 6 Under the same provisions, the entity is liable if the em-
ployee is liable, and is immune if the employee is immune. 7 The
entity is liable as a private person, therefore, except where im-
munity has been granted by statutory exception. The question that
will continue to confront the California courts is whether the act
or omission was discretionary or ministerial.
One of the purposes of the new legislation was to restate the
pre-existing law on discretionary immunity.'8 A brief review of
the California decisions indicates that the doctrine of discretionary
immunity, like the concept of the reasonable and prudent man, is
often mentioned but only vaguely understood.' 9 A need to protect
public officials from damage suits when injuries result from the
exercise of official judgment and discretion has long been recog-
nized.2" But there has been little uniformity in applying the doc-
trine to specific cases. The modern trend seems to protect public
employees who act in good faith in exercising discretion, but to
withhold protection when bad faith is encountered. 2
The pre-existing law on discretionary immunity may be sum-
marized as follows: 1. Any exercise of judgment may be construed
as discretionary. Proof that the duty was unqualifiedly required is
usually necessary in order to establish liability.22 A workable con-
13 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
14 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b).
15 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.
16 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2.
17 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2.
18 See note 2 supra, at 843.
19 Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 Pac. 462 (1920).
20 Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1854).
21 Galli v. Brown, 110 Cal. App. 2d 764, 243 P.2d 920 (1952).
22 In Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 Pac. 462 (1920), the
court stated:
It would seem a fair application of the rule would be that any duty is
ministerial which unqualifiedly requires the doing of a certain thing. To the
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cept of discretionary action does not exist in California law. 2. Scope
of authority includes anything collateral or incidental to the main
duty of the office of the person acting, thereby creating a strong
defense to the argument of ultra vires.2" 3. The prevailing view is
that the employee who acts within the scope of his authority in
performing a discretionary duty will be immune from liability, even
if motivated by malice, dishonesty, corruption or carelessness.24
A strong and continuing minority holds to the contrary.25 The
legislation of 1963 deals with each of these characteristics in the
pre-existing California law.
Discretionary Immunity, Scope of Employment and
Improper Motive after 1963 Legislation
The Legislature did not define discretionary immunity. The
scope of employment, however, has been clarified by provisions
dealing with activities which the case law protected as discretionary.
The purpose of these provisions is to help determine the scope of
employment without having to rely on piecemeal judicial decisions,
and to prevent the courts from redefining discretionary immunity
to exclude these acts previously considered discretionary.2" The
scope of immunity includes the following types of activities: execu-
tion or enforcement of any law, or enforcement of enactments
which are unconstitutional, invalid, or inapplicable; adoption or
failure to adopt enactments; issuance, revocation or denial of
licenses, permits and certificates of authorization; health and safety
inspections of private property; injuries caused by other persons;
prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings; authorized
extent that its performance is unqualifiedly required, it is not discretionary,
even though the manner of its performance may be discretionary.
In Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 Pac. 707 (1899), the court defined a ministerial
act as non-feasance or negligence in performing a duty which is plain, when the
means and ability to perform it are shown, and when the performance or non-
performance, or the manner of its performance involves no question of discretion.
23 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
24 Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957); Lipman v. Brisbane
Elementary School District, 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
In 77 HARV. L. REV. 224, Louis L. Jaffe states that in California immunity is abso-
lute unless the officer has acted outside, or in defiance of, the established formal rules
or in ways clearly beyond his competence.
25 Dillwood v. Riecks, 42 Cal. App. 602, 184 Pac. 35 (1919) (public officer
liable for negligence even though act was discretionary). See also Silva v. MacAuley,
135 Cal. App. 249, 26 P.2d 887, rehearing denied, 27 P.2d 791 (1933), and Collenberg
v. County of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. App. 2d 795, 310 P.2d 989 (1957), holding that
immunity of a county from liability for negligence does not relieve employees from
individual liability. (The effect of this decision may be nullified by the 1963 legisla-
tion making employee and entity liability coextensive.)
26 See note 1 supra, § 812.
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entries upon private property; money stolen from official custody;
misrepresentation.27
An important final consideration is the standard of care re-
quired of the employee. This appears to vary with the type of
activity. Due care is required in the execution of a law; good
faith for acting under an enactment which is invalid, inapplicable
or unconstitutional; good faith and probable cause for instituting
or prosecuting a judicial or administrative proceeding (under an-
other provision the entity is liable but can obtain indemnity from
the offending employee).28 The employee must indemnify the entity
for recoveries made against the entity for the acts of the employee
27 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.4. A public employee is not liable for his act or
omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing
in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false
imprisonment.
§ 820.6. If a public employee acts in good faith, without malice, and under the
apparent authority of an enactment that is unconstitutional, invalid or inapplicable,
he is not liable for an injury caused thereby except to the extent that he would
have been liable had the enactment been constitutional, valid and applicable.
§ 820.8. Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable
for injury caused by the act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section
exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his
own negligent or wrongful act or omission.
§ 821. A public employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption
of or failure to adopt an enactment or by his failure to enforce an enactment.
§ 821.2. A public employee is not liable for an injury caused by his issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of, or by his failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or
revoke, any permit, license, certificate or similar authorization where he is authorized
by enactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued,
denied, suspended or revoked.
§ 821.4. A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his failure to
make an inspection, or to make an adequate inspection, of any property, other than
the property of the public entity employing the public employee, for the purpose of
determining whether the property complies with or violates any enactment or con-
tains or constitutes a hazard to health or safety.
§ 821.6. A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or
prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding wthin the scope of his employ-
ment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.
§ 821.8. A public employee is not liable for an injury arising out of his entry
upon any property where such entry is expressly or impliedly authorized by law.
Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for an injury
proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.
§ 822. A public employee is not liable for money stolen from his official custody
unless the loss was sustained as a result of his own negligent or wrongful act or
omission.
§ 822.2. A public employee is not liable for misrepresentation unless he is guilty
of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.
See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 830.2, 830.4, 830.6, 830.8, 831, 831.2, 831.4, 831.6,
831.8, and 840.
28 CAL. GOv'T CODE § 825.6.
(a) If a public entity pays any claim or judgment, or any portion thereof,
either against an employee or former employee of the public entity, for an
injury arising out of an act or omission of the employee or former employee
of the public entity, the public entity may recover from the employee or
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involving actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.29 While this
would seem to apply only to malicious prosecution and possibly
to action under an invalid enactment, the question arises as to
whether this may be a minimum standard bearing upon other types
of tortious conductY0
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has adopted a policy of general
liability for torts committed by public employees and for the enti-
ties in whose behalf they perform. But even if general immunity
were found, while the doctrine of discretionary immunity remains,
either as an exception to general liability, or as the norm of general
immunity, the practicing attorney and the courts will be faced
with the task of determining whether this doctrine is or should
be the proper basis for liability.
lames V. Arnold
former employee the amount of such payment if he acted or failed to act
because of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice. Except as provided in
subdivision (b), a public entity may not recover any payments made upon ajudgment or claim against an employee or former employee if the public
entity conducted his defense against the action or claim.(b) If a public entity pays any claim or judgment, or any portion thereof,
against an employee or former employee of the public entity for an injury
arising out of his act or omission, and if the public entity conducted hisdefense against the claim or action pursuant to an agreement with him
reserving the rights of the public entity against him, the public entity may
recover the amount of such payment from him unless he establishes that the
act or omission upon which the claim or judgment is based occurred within
the scope of his employment as an employee of the public entity and thepublic entity fails to establish that he acted or failed to act because of
actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.
29 Ibid.
80 5 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep., Rec. § Studies 259 (1963). Arno Van
Alstyne, the author of the study upon which the 1963 legislation was based, states
that as a general rule public officials should not be immune from suit or personal
liability for malicious and corrupt acts.
